About Ending Perpetual War...

There was a lot of hoopla in my city last week, as President Obama was re-inaugurated amidst large crowds. Given the centrality of Obama to our blog (we started this 4 years ago after his initial inauguration, with some of our first posts devoted to capturing the movement that developed around him that catapulted him into the presidency), I though it'd be useful to write down a few thoughts about inauguration #2. The main takeaway from his speech was that he seemed far more bold on domestic politics: the references to climate change, Stonewall, and immigration were much stronger stances than he was willing to make in his first inauguration. Second-term presidencies can bring about more activism, obviously. But, for me, the most interesting part was his discussion of the need to end perpetual war (d'uh, I do international politics). Like so much about Obama, a lot of liberals applauded this (supposedly) brave statement and felt optimism about further distancing ourselves from the Bush years. But...yeah, as seems to be frequently the case with liberals and Obama, they didn't pay attention to what he has actually done. The press didn't do a particularly good job with this either, analyzing his words more than his actions. Perhaps Barry O is really committed to shifting away from militarism. But, the reality is, he's got to walk away from a lot of his own policies to do so.

Who hasn't tried to co-opt MLK?

As we celebrate MLK Day in America today (and the second inauguration of Barack Obama, one that is definitely being linked to MLK on a few levels...more on that later), I started thinking: why do we know so little about the real King and, as a result, why are so many able to co-opt his messages?

The MLK we're told about (that I've written about before - click here and here to read more) was a man who told us to live together in peace, for whites and blacks to embrace each other, and let our kids play together. This isn't a bad message at all, of course. However, we rarely get the more complicated politics that MLK touched on. He understood the connection between racism, economics, and politics. "I have a dream" is very special and historical...but the dream MLK wanted us to get to involved addressing war, poverty, and the nature of our political system. He was pro-labor (he was assassinated while supporting sanitation workers on strike in Memphis). He was critical of the economic divide in America. He was staunchly opposed to the Vietnam war, and not supportive of our foreign policy in general. He thought we exploited the poor at home and abroad. He had problems with moderate white American leaders, who would be willing to compromise on social issues to bring about a "peace" without justice. So...yeah, not as warm and fuzzy as we hear about. Of course, reality makes him (and those who fought alongside him - one man does not make a movement) far more courageous, noble, and worthy of rememberance. It wasn't easy to fight against segregation. Fighting against segregation, Vietnam, poverty, aspects of capitalism, political dealmaking...yeah, that's a lot more challenging.

Argo and Hollywood's "Muslim World" Problem

I happened to read a blurb about Argo, the new Middle East thriller directed by and starring Ben Affleck a month ago. As someone with a bit of understanding of the dynamics of Iran in the 20th century, I was clearly interested. Also, knowing that Affleck, a politically knowledgeable actor who was close to one of the most outspoken progressives of the 20th century, the late Howard Zinn, made me think that this might be a movie that could teach America a little about the Middle East, minus the usual jingoism and xenophobia. Well, having just watched Argo a few nights ago...progress is slow. Considering the rise of the Islamophobia network over the past decade, this is unfortunate. Argo is only slightly better than the usual Hollywood narrative about Muslims.

The 9/11 Decade - A Leadership Gap

We've just recently seen the 10 year anniversary of 9/11. There have been countless articles and pieces of analysis in the media about the topic, but I wanted to touch on an issue that I think many have neglected: the lack of political and civic leadership in framing 9/11 as a tragedy to connect Americans with others across the globe, which I'd argue has resulted in mostly a lost decade. Instead, 9/11 became an event to separate America from others. This helped enable hyper-nationalism and increased American exceptionalism, both very unusual given the nature of the event. Many leaders, particularly political ones, played this up. A consequence has been that Americans are, today, more likely to distance themselves from various out-groups, both outside of, and in, America (the Islamophobia industry is one of the downstream effects of this).

Podcast Episode 6: The Death of Osama bin Laden

On this episode of the There is No Spoon show, Fatima Ashraf questions Fouad Pervez, Junaid Ahmad, and Reggie Miller about their thoughts on the death of Osama Bin Laden. Fouad is an International Relations doctoral student at Georgetown University and a writer for Foreign Policy in Focus. His latest article, "Pepsi, Pot, Porn...and Politics" looks at the bizzarre discovery of those items on bin Laden's compound, and why they really illustrate the importance of politics over culture in al-Qaeda's modus operandi. Junaid is a faculty member at the Lahore University of Management Sciences and specializes in law and policy. He recently wrote an article, "Pakistan-U.S. relations in the post-Osama era" that examines the heightening tensions between the two countries after the raid. Junaid and Fouad have co-authored several pieces on U.S. foreign policy in South Asia, including this relevant and prescient article, "The US War on Pakistan." Reggie Miller is a non-profit management professional with significant insight into America's post-9/11 culture.

While many in the country celebrated his death, the No Spoon team ponders why it was okay for Americans to celebrate now and be upset at the thought of celebrations abroad on 9/11. They also discusses the serious issues surrounding Bin Laden's death including extra-judicial assassination, the state of affairs in Pakistan, and why Osama drinking Pepsi shouldn't have been a big deal.

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Podcast Episode 1: The Revolts in the Middle East

On this edition of the There is No Spoon show, we discuss the unrest in Egypt and how it relates to the region as a whole. We cover the Muslim Brotherhood, American foreign policy, authoritarian persistance, social movements, and political and economic roots of the uprisings. Our guest is Hesham Sallam, a PhD candidate at Georgetown who studies the persistance of authoritarian regimes, comparative Middle East politics, and is the co-editor of Jadaliyya, and online e-zine produced by the Arab Studies Institute - it is a great resource for analysis of the Middle East. Now that Mubarak has resigned, listen to the podcast and be informed about the issues that will develop in the coming days, weeks, and months.

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Episode 1 was recorded on February 8th, 2011 at 11pm EST.

This is what Democratization in the Middle East Looks Like - with Caveats

Wait a second...I though Arabs and Muslims and the Middle East region in general couldn't really handle democracy? That something about their culture explained that these people needed strong man running their states, not (real) popular electoral contests and a representative system of government. Well, I am shocked to see what is happening in the streets of Cairo right now. I am a bit surprised about what has happened in Tunisia, what is starting up in Yemen. Actually, I am a little alarmed by the level of repression used by the Mubarak regime in Egypt to try and silence the political dissent when it is clear the whole world is watching. But in terms of what is happening in the streets, this moment has been building for a long time. And no, Arabs, Muslims, and people in the Middle East are not predisposed to authoritarian rule. That's just the system that's been forced on them by force by some of their own elites and great powers abroad.

Pakistan: A Possible Future

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Ali thought to himself: should I report this? He had just walked by a conversation between two men regarding an effort to plan attacks against U.S. troops guarding the new massive embassy in Islamabad.

What do I do?

Ali and his family lived in the Northwest Frontier Province, in a small village about 100km away from the Swat valley. His family was quite poor. They lived in a small shack and he and his parents both worked in the fields. They basically kept to themselves and their family, and were apolitical in every sense of the word. They assumed that since they were all uneducated and illiterate, that they had no place in speaking out about their country.

Blackwater? Again? Really?

Blackwater (or Xe, as it is currently called - they changed their name to try and avoid attention after all the negative press they got from Jeremy Scahill's outstanding work on them, amongst others) recently recieved a $100 million contract for work in Afghanistan. CIA Director Panetta took to the airwaves on Sunday to defend the contract. Part of the reason why Blackwater got the contract is they presented a bid that was $26 million less than the nearest competitor. The contract is for a year, and could run up to 18 months. So...America's professional mercenary army, viewed very negatively in many parts of the world (Iraq is obviously the key sore spot, as they were banned from the country as a result of numerous incidents where they killed unarmed civilians), now gets a nice contract in Afghanistan. Raise your hand if you think this will go well? Anybody? Anybody?

Remember Afghanistan?

"Hey! Are you even listening to me?" Afghanistan snapped her fingers at American Media to get her attention. "What's wrong? It's like you don't even remember me. We used to be so close and now, you're...so distant," she muttered to her old friend as she looked away in confusion. "Did I do something wrong?"

"No, I've just been busy. You know, Helen Thomas' chair, LeBron James, Lady Gaga, the new iPhone, and oil on some animals," replied American Media, still looking away from Afghanistan and focusing on something in the horizon.

"But, you forgot...you forgot about the anniversary."

"Anniversary?" American Media had a puzzled look on her face.

"Yeah...the anniversary. Just this past month, your conflict here surpassed Vietnam as America's longest war."

"But...but...no, that can't be right. How is that possible?" American Media started pacing around the room, nervously. She finally looked at Afghanistan in the eyes. "How did this happen? How did I forget?"

About Helen...

So, by now, I think everyone knows about veteran White House correspondent Helen Thomas' comments about Israel. Thomas, one of the few in the White House press corps that actually challenged the office, rather than kowtowing to them, said some unfortunate things about Israel in response to the Gaza flotilla raid. Whether or not you support or condemn Israeli actions, saying that they should go back to Poland and Germany is a bit harsh. I get that she was speaking out of anger about the situation, but she should have known better. There's a more intelligent way to speak against Israeli policy if you oppose it. That being said, the coverage about her has gotten a bit out of hand. And nobody illustrated that better than Jon Stewart last night. (video after the jump). Stewart took his shots at her as well, but his segment about it on the Daily Show also addressed the problems with the media coverage of Thomas better than anyone else. Again, Mark Twain has to play the role of Edward R. Murrow, as I've lamented on before.

In the US, it seems Helen Thomas has become a bigger story than the raid itself. And the raid itself became a bigger story than the discussion about the Gaza blockade in the first place (more about that in an upcoming post). She was forced to retire because of the comments. Now, again, I think what she said was problematic, but I also understand she spoke out of anger. I think her words pale in comparison to the actions of the White House press corps in general. Instead of asking real questions, they often play nice to gain favor with the administration. See where that got us with that whole Iraq war? A lot of Americans and Iraqis aren't here today because the press didn't care to ask hard questions. Thomas was one of the few.

Some are (predictably) adopting the reactionary response, calling Thomas a long-time anti-Semite. She was obviously critical of Israeli policy. That doesn't make her anti-Semitic. That makes her a critic of Israeli policy, like a lot of people. Could she have articulated her arguments better? Sure. That's different than saying she's anti-Semitic.

So, yeah, instead of using this as a way to discuss the broader issues about the raid or the blockade or the US media's view of the Middle East in general, we go after the 89 year old. Good job, you worthless charlatans. Even a Fox News piece said enough is enough about the way people are going after Thomas. So...get 'em, Jon.

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Fort Hood and U.S. Foreign Policy

I've been meaning to put some thoughts down about the shootings at Fort Hood for a minute, but just haven't gotten around to it yet. There has been plenty of typical sensationalist media coverage (best exemplified by the common "terrorists in America?" theme going around), along with some crazy racist nutjob stories (the "Muslim conspiracy theory" stuff, linking this all to the plot to infiltrate Congress through interns and the military through officers like Hasan - really insane stuff). I'm going to stay away from that stuff because, well, there's not really anything there. If you want to read about the Islamophobia that arose after the attack, check out this piece. Instead, let me talk about the one angle we haven't heard much about - how this tragedy is directly linked to U.S. foreign policy.

As we find out more information, we discover that Major Hasan had serious grievances with American foreign policy in relation to Iraq and Afghanistan. Not unlike a lot of other people. Pretty legitimate beef, too...the unreal number of civilian casualties, the number of U.S. casualties, the manipulated WMD evidence, the occupations, the pliant governments, the sweet military contracts and business deals, the trampling on international laws/norms/institutions...lots of beef. The closer you follow things, the more clear it becomes that Hasan's act of violence was driven primarily by his rage at these issues. And, while his actions are deplorable and should be condemned, that doesn't get U.S. foreign policy off the hook. There are serious problems with what we've done and are doing in Afghanistan and Iraq. Hasan's anger at the situation is not dissimilar from the anger millions around the world feel about the conflicts. Had he opted for civil disobedience instead of murder, he'd be like so many Americans, infuriated by the government's foreign policy.

In fact, Hasan provides us a domestic example of what we might be doing to Iraqis and Afghanis. He worked with vets returning from the wars, many with serious mental and physical injuries. Hasan apparently had a hard time dealing with the pain he saw them going through. He obviously opposed the wars, identified with the victims of the wars (both the soldiers he worked with, and the civilians with whom he probably identified with as Muslims), and, despite attempts to be discharged because of his concern about his difficulties serving a military whose actions he could not reconcile with his own beliefs, was about to be sent over to Afghanistan. In a simple sense, Hasan clearly snapped. Post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) sure comes to mind.

Now, imagine a civilian in Afghanistan. You've seen countless neighbors, friends, and family members either killed or seriously injured in the continued war, possibly by NATO forces, bombing raids, or extremist elements running rampant in the country due to the lawlessness aided by Washington's support of an inept regime (and lack of financial backing to stabilize the country). You're in a worse place than Hasan. There is a pretty good chance you're on the verge of snapping, or just waiting for a chance to attack and kill somebody. There is countless psychological research on versions of prospect theory, social identity theory, and post-traumatic stress disorder that can be used to explain both Hasan's actions, as well as those of civilians stuck in horrific wars. Basically, if Hasan did what he did, what do you think the civilians in Iraq or Afghanistan are likely to do if they got a chance? This isn't some ideational thing...these violent outbursts are very specific to the context of the situation.

Thus, we could see Hasan as possibly a tamer version of what we might be producing abroad with policies that many inside and outside of America have serious qualms with. Um...shouldn't that be, I don't know, a pretty important angle for the press to cover on this story? It's all about foreign policy. You'd think it might even trigger some re-evaluation of our policies.

One other point...Hasan tried like hell to get out of the military. Some stories suggest he hired a lawyer to try to get discharged. His aunt says he offered to pay for his medical training in exchange for a discharge. He himself suggested the military allow Muslims to be conscientious objectors when America was fighting Muslims. No matter how you slice it, he had serious qualms and wanted out. Would you want a psychiatrist, who worked primarily with veterans who were dealing with serious physical and mental issues from the wars, to stay in such a position with his concerns? No way. Yet, they wouldn't discharge him. Why? I don't know, could it be our massive military footprint all over the globe? Over 750 bases in 39 countries (plus over 100 additional bases outside of the continental US, troops in 151 foreign countries, occupiers in two separate countries where we have major conflict still raging...yeah, we're probably slightly overstretched. And by slightly, I mean unbelievably. So much so that the Army can't really spare any soldier, including someone like Hasan. Again...direct link to our foreign policy. Are we stretched so thin that we're putting people in the field who really shouldn't be there?

Anyway, aside from the stories about the victims and the tragedy itself, it seems to me that these are really important issues that we should think about when reflecting on the Fort Hood shootings. The event has a very direct link to U.S. foreign policy, one that should be probed pretty deeply. This connection hasn't been looked at enough, but hopefully we can convince people it should be examined. It would be a way to really do justice to the memories of those who lost their lives in that tragic event, along with countless other innocents who have died in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.

(For a sharper analysis on Fort Hood, check out this FPIF article. For a discussion of Fort Hood and PTSD, check out this piece by the always-excellent Dahr Jamail and this NPR article)

America's Tortuous History with Iran

(Note: I wrote most of this about a month ago, and have tried to update it) I've avoided posting something about all that is going on in Iran for a few reasons. One, I've got to finish up a paper soon! Two, others in the blogosphere have been posting great stuff thus far, and I'm not sure what exactly I'd contribute. Three...I'm a little confused as to what I should even say. I think the opposition party probably won the election (at the very least, the results were fishy), and I certainly don't support the use of violence against protesters, but I think some U.S. leaders are taking advantage of the situation to spew sentiments against the Iranian state, as well as their "pro-freedom" nonsense. Also, I know the history between America and Iran, and minus President Truman's ability to stop a U.S. led overthrow of Prime Minister Mossadegh (which eventually happened, under President Eisenhower), the U.S. seems to have done nothing good in regards to Iran...so, what does that say about American support for Mousavi?

Okay, so here's my contribution to the discussion. I want to focus on the complicated history of American involvement in Iran, why that has had a huge impact on what preceded, and how that should (and is) impacting what the U.S. does now.

So, the basics...Iran's monarchs were hardly stellar rulers. In a key moment in history, the Shah Mozzafar al-din Shah Qajar conceded an incredible amount of control of Iranian oil to the British in 1901 - this helped the Shah pay for his rather lavish lifestyle. The deal gave him 16% of all future oil profits, along with a lump sum payment. While 16% is a lot for a single person, it isn't much for a total nation, which is where the problem grew from. That oil contract ultimately led to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), which later became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), which eventually turned into British Petroleum/Beyond Petroleum (BP), who probably have a gas station somewhere near where you live. Not only did Iran get a very minor share of the money (especially considering the fact that the oil was theirs in the first place), the British also had a bureacracy in place that made it nearly impossible for Iran to even know what APOC/AIOC profits were. Basically, they were getting ripped off.

The British made minor concessions, but ultimately, Iran still got a really short end of the stick. By the late 1940s, AIOC was making after-tax profits of around 40 million pounds...these are profits, mind you. And what was Iran's total share of money? Less than 10 million pounds. Not surprisingly, Iran wanted a fairer deal, using the US deal with Saudi Arabia (a 50-50 split) as the example. Britain refused, Iran nationalized, Britain pushed major sanctions on Iran, which ravaged their economy. The U.S. wanted the British to concede, but ultimately, the Dulles boys suceeded in framing Iranian Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh as a potential "communist", the U.S. opted to join British efforts and sponsor a coup in 1953 to overthrow the popular and democratically elected Mossadegh in favor of their client, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Britain's role faded, the U.S. became the dominant power in the region, and America backed the Shah, despite his massive repression in Iran. We sold him billions of dollars in weapons, provided him billions of dollars in economic and military aid, used the CIA to train the SAVAK (essentially the Shah's thought police), looked the other way when much of the globe was decrying his obvious human rights abuses...Jimmy Carter did this as well, even though many think Carter's "human rights" agenda actually spelled the fall of the Shah. It didn't - at every key moment when Carter could have pressed the Shah to loosen his iron grip, he didn't.

Not shockingly, the Shah's brutal authoritarian rule finally fell in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. Not surprisingly, the opposition took a strong anti-American slant. There is a lot of research that looks at post-revolution externalizing of threat i.e. in order to quiet trouble on the home front, politicians will focus their ire on the outside foe, and this clearly happened in Iran after the revolution - and, given the US role in keeping the Shah's brutal regime around, there was certainly a reason for Iranians to not be kosher with the U.S. Of course, post-revolution Iran didn't exactly turn out the way it was supposed to, either...Khomeini and the hardline clerics silenced their more liberal allies from the movement against the Shah and turned a secular authoritarian dictatorship to basically a religious authoritarian dictatorship. All the while, America remained a prime enemy.

It is a travesty that the mainstream media has not focused a decent amount of their discussion on what is happening in Iran on this past. This history matters pretty significantly, and explains some of the nuanced posturing by the Obama administration. In contrast to his policies on Pakistan and Afghanistan, I actually think Obama is doing okay on Iran. Unlike the Republicans (I don't mean all Republicans, actually, mostly the neocons, who shouldn't even count as Republicans because they are really descendants of the supposedly liberal Woodrow Wilson school of thought) who are clamoring for Obama to pick a fight with the regime in Iran over the elections, Obama seems to be taking the history into account. The second he takes a position openly supportive of Mousavi and the reformists, they are done. They suddenly become U.S. puppets (like the Shah), the resistance becomes U.S.-manufactured (like the "resistance" against Mossadegh), and Iranians will turn on them.

The reality is, this is an indigenous resistance to the regime that has been building for a long time. It isn't this sudden Twitter revolution that the U.S. media is making it out to be. Iranian scholars like Hamid Dabashi have been writing about it for years. It has absolutely nothing to do with America. Not a damn thing, okay? Obama's speech in Cairo did not inspire it in any way. The Bush administration's rhetoric about "spreading freedom" did not provide it any backbone. This is all Iran. Iranians have not been cool with their post-revolution state. They've had a hard time actually doing something about it because, yeah, its hard to get masses on the streets when you are in an authoritarian state that has few qualms with cracking some heads. This is why it was tough to mount a sustained opposition to the Shah...it was only when he went too far and pissed off too many people that things started happening. If this was an academic paper, I'd insert something about prospect theory here, but I'll leave that one alone for now. Anyway, same thing here...the election results seem very peculiar, and that may have been the straw that broke the camel's back, if you will. Thus, massive numbers in the streets. This was too much for them to take.

So, thinking America somehow has some kind of important role in all that is happening in Iran is absolutely incorrect. Interjecting ourselves into the equation will only cause more problems, because of the particular history of U.S. involvement in Iran. That's not to say we can't do anything, but it does limit (and I would argue, clarify) Obama's options. We can't openly back the opposition, because of 1953 and the Shah years. We can't take credit for what's happening because that is a disservice to Iranians and will show our incredible arrogance yet again (because, you know, America is totally the source of all dissent against enemies of freedom, or something like that...sounds like a Bush speech).

One thought I have is to use Obama's insistence on meeting with Iran without preconditions as proof of our interest in not intervening in order to maybe help the parties negotiate a solution. Obama can say, look, we're going to work with whoever is in charge (and it's going to be Ahmadinejad - I see no way Mousavi gets in power at all at this point), so that doesn't matter. Instead, we simply want a stable Iran, which means no violent crackdowns on protesters, an action that only further delegitimizes the regime. It also means, hey, lets limit the reasons for the massive protests, which is to say, let's work out a deal between the parties. That almost certainly means Ahmadinejad is going to be the President, but maybe Mousavi can be put in some key position and most importantly, some of his platform ideas can be implemented.

Truthfully, there isn't a massive difference between the two sides in terms of their political goals - Ahmadinejad wants to improve relations with the U.S., just like Mousavi. Both want Iran to continue pursuing the nuclear option. Ahmadinejad is obviously down with the current political system more than Mousavi, but again, that is something that can be discussed in negotiations. Many of the clerics are opposing the election results, and are not okay with the political involvement of Ayatollah Khamanei. Iranians are not protesting the entire system (which would be a revolution), but are protesting specific things - the results of the election, and maybe the role of the clerics [the Khamanei ones, though, not the ones in Qom, etc., who don't want the religious scholars to play politics]. Thus, its not that the entire Iranian system needs to be changed (something that would definitely not be a negotiable point if the U.S. tried to help settle things), but maybe it needs to be tinkered, as in, the clerics need to take a less political role.

I don't mean to dictate what needs to be negotiated, of course, and the U.S. should not do so, either. I'm just suggesting some options. What is important, of course, is that the U.S. maybe try to get all the sides together to help resolve the problem, with a commitment to not interfere. Iranians might be able to do this on their own, of course. But I'm just suggesting this as one of the only avenues of involvement Obama can really take in this case. Some U.S. political leaders who are pressing Obama to take a more active role are delusional, ignorant of the past, or both. Some, like Newt Gingrich, are now suggesting we sabotage Iran's oil and gas refineries to bring the nation to an economic crisis in order to bring down the Iranian regime. Seriously. I did not make that up. Um, Newt, so-called historian, do you know anything about what the British did to Iran in response to Mossadegh in the early 1950s? Try to destroy the Iranian economy through sanctions. You honestly think Iranians are somehow going to forget that episode, because the late 1940s and early 1950s aren't really that important in Iranian history or anything, and instead just be cool with your idea? Did you stop to think that it might, I don't know, elicit a massive level of nationalism that includes both reformers and conservatives? In fact, isn't this precisely what progressives Iranians who oppose the regime have been warning about for years? Newt, I am very happy a man with your level of insanity and your complete misreading (or, more likely, no reading) of context and history, isn't running America.

I'm not really sure what else we really can do in this case that would help the situation. It would be nice if, on their interviews, they were pressed more about this point ("Senator, I hear you, we obviously don't like the violence used by the state against the people in the streets, but aren't you aware of America's complicated past with Iran, and doesn't that history make the actions you are advocating more harmful for the Iranian state?"). More importantly, if we discussed the history more, it might show us how short-sighted and problematic interventions (like the 1953 coup, and backing the Shah when we knew he was a ruthless leader who was only inflaming Iranians) really tie our hands in the future. This is the most important lesson, in my view, to take from all this. We can't really do much with Iran right now because of our particular actions in the past. This should open a conversation into backing authoritarian regimes, relying on politicized intelligence, etc., a discussion that we crucially need to have in the open now. Iran today should be a key example of why we need to have that discussion today - but only if we start looking into our history of involvement in the country, something the media has largely ignored so far.

More than Words

[Note: I wrote this before the speech. I have since included some general thoughts and links post-speech at the end of the post]

Did I just reference an Extreme song from the early 90's? And did you just recognize that I just referenced an Extreme song from the early 90's? Shame on all of us...

Okay...back to seriousness. President Obama has recently headed over to the Middle East, and will be making a much anticipated speech in Cairo on Thursday. There is tons of hype for this speech, which I first remember hearing about shortly after the election in November. I want to offer my thoughts on what Obama should focus on. Whether he'll deliver is an entirely different story.

I'm going to use Madeleine Albright as my jumping-off point. Albright wrote an interesting op-ed in the NY Times earlier this week, and has been pretty active in what I'd call an "engaging the Muslim world" agenda. Personally, I prefer Juan Cole to Albright every day of the week on this type of work. Why? Read Albright's op-ed. It's a PR push, by and large, with some acknowledgement of the difficulties the Muslim world is facing as a result of US foreign policy. So, basically, its Dubya and Karen Hughes, except kinder and gentler. Fantastic. I totally think this will work. Really. Sure. Awesome. This is the same Albright of the "we think the price is worth it" statement regarding the Iraq sanctions and the 500,000+ dead Iraqi children and millions more with stunted development as a result of the sanctions. Yes, she apologized later, but it was years later (sounds like somebody's interested in preserving their legacy), and in her book, she apologized for the comment, but not the policy - so, she had no problem with the policy, just the way she answered Stahl's question on 60 Minutes. I won't go into a long discussion about the Iraq sanctions, but lets just say I think they were brutal, one of the worst forms of political punishment in recent history, and have done irreparable damage to the US in Iraq and the Muslim and Arab world. Read Anthony Arnove's brilliant edited volume on the sanctions for more info.

So, Albright is basically saying Obama needs to make a better sale of our policies to Muslims, that we're fighting people who are attacking them as well. Okay, that's sort of true. But Albright makes the claim that the biggest beef the Muslim world has with the US is the feeling that the US is at war with Islam. Yeah, that's partly true...but why would they think that? Well...because of our policies, which she doesn't advocate changing. This is another attempt to make this about ideology, which it isn't. It does often feed into that, but if you work on the actual political issues, issues that, quite honestly, Muslims have legitimate gripes about, that's the way out of this dangerous cycle.

Unfortunately, Albright isn't up for bringing that point up much. Too bad...because she knows better. Her op-ed actually isn't that bad - it just puts political roots of the problems between the US and the Muslim world (whatever that is...Muslims are not a monolithic group, but whatever, I'll roll with it for the time being) in the back-burner, something I think is fatally flawed. She correctly points out that Obama should speak out against repression, including the kind practiced in Egypt as a form of "moderation". Right on...but she then selects out a democratically-elected Hamas from being part of the solution. Again, by excluding the political gripes from the discussion, we completely whitewash the reasons Hamas was elected by Palestinians in the first place - a corrupt Fatah that was unable to make any progress on peace with Israel, and a continuation (and worsening) of the occupation (especially in Gaza, a place where the depravity has reached an absolutely shameful level, thanks to the neglect of the international community over the past 4 years).

This is a general problem with most US foreign policy types. They are interested in improving America's image, without addressing the reasons that image has slipped with a less-than-acceptable level of honesty. They also are either completely ignorant, or disingenous, about the Muslim world. I've spent time in some of these countries, and let me tell you, they know their politics. I'm not talking about the rich, well-to-do, professional class. I'm talking about the peasants, the street vendors, the cab drivers...the "people", if you will. Unlike mainstream America, which knows less about history and current politics than it does about the previous round of American Idol (something I largely attribute to a poor education system and a press that I at times consider somewhere between Pravda and Hearst's New York Journal), Muslims are much more aware of politics, even if they throw some conspiracies into the picture.

This point is ultimately why what Albright and many others want Obama to do will ultimately fail. Obama needs to do a whole lot more than just sell American policies better. Yes, I do agree with Albright that the US is not at war with Islam. Is this even a real idea among Muslims? I seriously doubt it...if you asked them which statement is more accurate, the US is at war with Muslims versus the US pursues unjust policies towards Muslims, I'd bet the vast majority go with the latter. Now, if they're just blaming the US for everything, that's not really something we can do anything about. However, if you go through the list of issues, you'd have to be a stubborn jingoist (or clinically insane like Glenn Beck) to not see there are some legitimate claims.

As such, Obama's task in Cairo is a bit more complicated than Albright and others propose. Yes, he must reach out to the Muslim world and do a better job at selling American policies, which will be exponentially easier because he's not George W. Bush. However, he must be honest and talk about the real political grievances. He must actually have a conversation with the Muslim world, not just lecture them about "their shortcomings." He must be humble about America's mistakes, and vow to work hard to correct those missteps. But he must know, talk will be cheap without action. Given all that has happened, no matter how good the speech, no matter how honest or humble it is, no matter how much it really is a conversation with the Muslim world, it will be for naught if we don't begin working on the policy issues. PR might work in America (where Karl Rove can swift boat John Kerry, Max Cleland, etc.), but it won't do jack in the Muslim world.

This is really why I hope he and his administration shun the advice offered by Albright and many others. They need to provide real support (i.e. not military aid) to Muslim countries in dire economic crises. They need to push Israel as hard as they have the Palestinians and work as hard as possible on securing a just and real peace between the two. (btw, check out this post on Steve Clemons' site with some good links up on the settlements) They need to look closely at Kashmir, and work hard to get India and Pakistan to the negotiating table. Cutting back the drone attacks in Pakistan wouldn't hurt, either. They also need to find ways to create exits for autocratic dictators in Muslim countries (such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia), leaders who are only in power due to US backing and who are increasingly detested by their own citizens for their repression, and encourage greater political freedom in these countries. They need to continue engaging Iran and Syria instead of rattling the cage as Bush did. Basically, they have to show the Muslim world they are credibly committed to improving the relationship. Only then can they expect the Muslim world to return the favor.

To quote De La Soul, stakes is high. This speech matters a lot, but ony in the context of what follows. If Obama opts primarily for PR work while being more "sensitive" to issues Muslims are angry about, things won't get any better. If he realizes that talk without real action is just singing without melody and a beat, we might actually be getting somewhere. There are indications that the latter is true (particularly his stance on the Israeli settlements - though we should read that with a little caution, as Stephen Walt advises). Let's see what happens.

For some good further reading on pre-speech thoughts, check out some thoughts from Marc Lynch and Juan Cole.

Post-speech thoughts: Okay, that was actually quite good. I'm not going to go into too much depth here, mostly because most of my thoughts have been better articulated elsewhere, but here's my quick 2 cents. He spoke about the suffering of Palestinians more clearly than any US president ever. That means a lot. He didn't push Hamas out of the door...important...instead, trying to encourage political moderation. Not crazy about the Afghanistan and Pakistan policy, but that's a given - the real test is if he's serious about providing human aid versus military aid to Pakistan, and whether he gets a regional coalition together in Afghanistan. He did as good a job as I could expect on the religion aspect...good job with faith versus politics. He came off as generally sincere, trying to have a dialogue with Muslims across the world, unlike his predecessor(s) who have done nothing of the sort. Basically, the speech went about as good as possible - which is pretty good, actually. I think its safe to say he has most Muslims around the globe wanting to roll with him. The next few steps are crucial, of course. Does he keep the pressure on Israel regarding the settlements? Does he use the massive US aid to Israel and Egypt as leverage to bring Israel to the table for a real (i.e. not Camp David, not the Road Map) 2-state solution and to force Egypt to really begin liberalizing politically?

For really good analysis of the speech, I turn you to some of my favorite reads: Juan Cole, (and as a bonus, Cole also has a post with some reaction to the speech in the Middle East), Marc Lynch, Steve Clemons, Robert Dreyfuss, Daniel Levy, and Stephen Walt. Also, Democracy Now had an interview with Juan Cole and Issandr El Amrani about the talk.

Hotspot: Pakistan

There has been a lot of focus lately on how the US needs to proceed on Pakistan. It is clearly one of the most important places in the world, so the attention is well-warranted. The Obama administration has essentially continued the Bush administration's military policy in Pakistan, which largely consists of bombing the northwest region of the country with drone aircrafts, something that may be happening in a wink wink nudge nudge coordinated manner with the Pakistani government. There have been hints that the administration will also increase non-military aid to the country, something Biden talked about quite a bit during the campaign. But, as of now, the main policy is air strikes. That raises the question: is this making things better or worse?

On the one hand, the drone attacks may be effective in combating militancy in the country. Some have argued this type of response puts the US in a position of power in Pakistan, something it may need to be in given the Pakistani government's record on going after militants. This approach makes one big assumption, though: that the drones are actually hitting militants and not civilians. A recent report notes the exact opposite has happened, that from the 60 predator drone strikes, 14 militants and 687 civilians have been killed. In a country where the US is perceived as a bigger threat than extremists, these numbers, if they're even remotely close to the real numbers, suggest the policy may be seriously flawed. This strengthens the counter-argument that the strikes have actually increased militancy in Pakistan. They have destabilized the state, and only helped heighten regional issues as well. Maybe the U.S. is overestimating the threat in Pakistan and reacting in far too zealous manner, making things worse?

My take is, Pakistan has a lot of problems, but most of them are not related to militant groups directly. The country is falling apart, but few are helping, or even talking about helping, Pakistan deal with its economic and energy problems, not to mention the political issues (leadership of the three main parties are very problematic - they make U.S. politicians seem competent...at times).

The populace doesn't seem to really support the ideological views of the militant groups we seem to be so preoccupied with. In that sense, we may have an opportunity to isolate the real militants from those who have joined for political or economic reasons - I suspect the hard-core belt of militants is a pretty small share of the already small share of the population. Of course, to accomplish this, the U.S. would have to change some of its policies. Targeting militants is fine...but you need Pakistanis to support you. In that sense, what we really need to do is build an alliance with the Pakistani people, who we have largely neglected for most of state's history. This means walking a more cautious line on the air strikes (maybe abandoning them for a while), increasing non-military aid and offering technical assistance on energy and water (Pakistan faces severe shortages on both), provide some security guarantees due to the U.S. nuclear deal with India, and perhaps most importantly, make a serious effort to get a fair resolution on Kashmir. Both India and Pakistan will need to make compromises, but the U.S. will have to take a leadership role in the process. An agreement on Kashmir between Delhi and Islamabad would make it exponentially easier for both countries to target more important issues.

Now, that's not to say militancy isn't a problem. It is, in fact, a threat to the country. These groups are gaining power and are implementing some pretty draconian measures in their communities. The Swat deal was a pretty good indication of the growing danger. The question, then, becomes, is this an ideologically-based, or economically/politically-based problem? The rhetoric is all about ideology, but I think the real motives are economic/political. If we work on rectifying/improving those, I think we cleave most of the support these groups have away from them, and we turn the vast majority of the population on whoever is left in these groups. This is why I am pretty adamant about the importance of acting sooner rather than later. However, given the high stakes, we need to implement the best actions. Yes, these groups need to be targeted, but if our actions to do so create more militants, the policy isn't working. Thus far, I think that is definitely the case.

If Pakistanis views America as a real ally and not a threat (a reversal from the current view), we could see real stability in the region. This might only require some subtle changes from our current policy, but it will not be easy and will certainly take some time. However, it could pay huge dividends in the future.